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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
BAILM!>NTS-CARR!llRS-CONVERSION-TuOVER BY BAIL!>!> (A COMMON CAR-
RTI:R) AGAINST A THIRD Pi;:RSON.-On the facts as stated by the court of last 
resort it is often difficult to discover why any action should ever have been 
thought of, and impossible to see how the judgment of the trial court should 
have been in favor of the preposterous claim of the plaintiff. Such seems 
to be the case of Farmers' Cotton Oil Co. v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry. Co. 
(Ala. 1918), 79 So. 387. Plaintiff carrier by mistake delivered cotton seed to 
defendant company. Defendant by mistake, not even negligent mistake it 
would appear, received and used the cotton seed and paid the freight. 'fhe 
consignor and his vendee called off the sale, and defendant paid to the con-
signee the full or agreed price for the seed. The carrier then demande.d the 
seed of defendant, and without offering to return the freight money now 
brings trovcr ! 
That a bailee may in proper case sue a third person for conversion of 
the bailed chattel; that such bailee as agent may sue to recover back his 
principal's property delivered to a third person by mistake; that a carrier 
who delivers the goods to the wrong party is ab~olutely liable and may be 
sued in trover; and that one may be guilty of conversion though he acted 
in good faith, and without knowledge of the true ownership of the gvods, 
are all principles too well settled to need citation of authority. See, how-
ever, Mr. Freeman's monographic note to Bolling v. Kirby, 90 Ala. 215, 25 
Am. S. R 789, and Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S. 259, Pacific Express Cc. v. 
Shearer, 16o Ill. 215. It may be admitted that a bailee may maintain detinue 
or trover against a third person who has fraudulently or wrongfully induced 
the bailee to deliver to him the goods of the bailor, or who receiving the 
goods innocently now wrongfully retains them. Walker v. L. & N. R. Co., 
III Ala. 233. But this cannot be extended to a case like the present, where 
the third person has settled with both bailor and bailee all their just claims 
for the goods and their carriage. 
BouNDARIES-ACCRr:TlON OR AVULSION.-In an action of ejectmcnt the 
plaintiff's right to recovery turned on whether the land in question was in 
Arkansas. Prior to 1873 the principal and navigable channel of the Mis-
sissippi River swept in a curve toward Arkansas around the land in dispute; 
across the peninsula of Mississippi land formed by this curve there was a 
chute through which in times of high water some water flowed. Gradually 
this chute increased in volume of water carried and finally, after many years, 
it became the main channel. Held, that the state line had not moved to the 
chute, hence the land sued for was not in Arkansas. Davis v. A11dcrso11-
Tt1lley Co. (C. C. A., 8th Circ., 1918), 252 Fed. 68r. 
When the boundary line between states is a navigable stream the rule of 
the tlialweg applies, and the line is the middle of the main navigable channel. 
Arka11sas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158. The same rule ought to apply as be-
tween private owners. In case of shifting of this line by accretion and 
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erosion the boundaries will shift. I7 MICH. L. R.Ev. 95; Gijf ord \'. Yarbor-
ough, 5 Bing I63; Lovillgston v. St. Clair County, 64 Ill. 56. Where, how-
ever, by avulsion a river suddenly changes its course or land is suddenly 
left dry by the recession of the sea there is no change in boundaries. Gif-
ford v. Yarborough, supra; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra. In the principal 
case the change in the channel was accomplished slowly enough to meet the 
requirements of the rule regarding accretion and erosion, but there was 
neither accretion nor erosion, for the water did not gradually "creep" over 
the land. Although not strictly a case of avulsion the same reasons for the 
result in such cases led to a similar result here. See also Washington v. 
Oregl•n, 2II U. S. I27. 
CA.'lRif,RS-PASSf,NGERS - NEGLIGENCE. -An apparently healthy passenger 
fell in stepping from the platform of a ship's companion way into a life 
boat, both boats being practically motionless. Held, it was not negligence 
for a seaman who steadied her when she began the step to let her go before 
she placed her foot on the thwart of the life boat. Goode v. Oceaiiic St1:am 
Nav. Co., Ltd. (19I8), 25I Fed. 556. 
Plaintiff made no claim that defendant owed any duty to assist her, but 
having volunteered to do so, he must exercise due c;i,re. That a person under 
no duty to act, \\ho volunteers assistance will be held liable for injuries 
caused by his failure to exercise the proper degree of care is well recognized. 
Black v. Rj•. Ca., I93 Mass. 448. In Hanlon v. Central R. Co. of N. J., I87 
N. Y. 73, this principle is emphasized. Defendant's servant assisted t.l:ie plain· 
tiff in alighting from a railway carriage and removed his support before 
she got down, causing a fall and the injury complained of. The court said, 
"The situation in this case it is true was not such as to suggest any serious 
danger to the plaintiff in leaving the car: but, when the conductor assumed 
to extend his aid in doing so, she had a right to accept it and rely upon his 
act as being a careful one." This position is approved in Younglove v. Pull-
man Co., 207 Fed. 797 at 802; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Carlisle, 2 Ala. 
App. 5I4; Moody v. Boston & M. R.R. I89 Mass. 277; Nashville etc. R. Co. 
v. Newsom,• et ux (Tenn. Nov:, I9I8), 203 S W. 33. In Southern Traction 
Co. v. Reagor ('l'ex.) I86 S. W. 272, the care to be exercised in such cases 
is characterized as of "the highest degree." It is submitted the generally 
accepted and correct statement is that the care to be exercised is such as an 
ordinary, prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances, the 
degree varying with the circumstances. Ry. Co. v. Newsome et u.x, supra. 
The court apparently is not disposed to quarrel with this doctrine. It bases 
its decision on the proposition that the assistance was only for the purpose 
of helping plaintiff get started. No authority is cited in support of this 
distinction. None has been found. On the contrary, the cases seem to hold 
that the purpose is to assist in safely completing the matter in hand. Blaclt 
v. Ry. Co., supra; Younglove v. Pullman Co., supra, at p. 8o2; Hanlon v. Ry. 
Co., .mpra; Ry. Co. v. Marrs, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 388. The decision stresses the 
fact that the step was an easy one, that the plaintiff was in apparent good 
health, that the harbor was calm, etc., creating the impression that the court 
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considered it as a mere perfunctory offer of assistance not expected to be 
seriously relied upon nor seriously extended. On this point, Hanlo1} v. Ry. 
Co., supra, would seem to be decisive. Defendant's conjectures on the ex-
tent to which the plaintiff intended to rely, or was relying on his assistance 
should have no weight in determining what reliance the plaintiff might safely 
place on the offer of assistance Defendant's act was the best evidence by 
which the plaintiff could regulate her conduct and having offered his service, 
he had no right to presume it unnecessary so long as the apparent need for 
it was as great as when offered. 
CoNSTITUTIONAI, LAW-WOMEN AS GRAND JuRORs.-The Constitution of 
Nevada provided that no person should be tried for a capital or other infam-
ous crime except on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. Sec. 27, Art. 
4, reads: "Laws shall be made to exclude from serving on juries, all persons 
not qualified electors of this state." An amendment to the Constitution ex-
tended to women the right to be qualified electors. The petitioner in a pro-
ceeding in prohibition alleged that he was indicted by a grand jury composed 
of men and women; and claimed that the indicment was invalid since the suf-
frage amendment did not operate to make women competent to serve on grand 
juries. Held, that the indictment was valid. Sec. 27, Art. 4. was intended 
by the framers of the Constitution, to substitute "qualified electors" for the 
common law qualifications that men only could serve. Parns v. Dist. Court, 
etc. (Nevada, 1918), 174 Pac. 7o6. 
The prevailing opinion is hardly supportable. There is no need to resort 
to hairsplitting to justify the conclusion that the court violated one of the 
elementary rules of logic, namely, that an affirmative conclusion cannot be 
drawn from a negative premise. BODE, AN OUTLINE OF LoGIC, 71. The dis-
senting opinion very correctly declares that the article "is one of exclusion 
and not of inclusion," that there is "a wide difference between a statute 
or constitutional provision which imposes jury duty upon a class of per-
sons and one which excludes all other persons except a designated class." 
The passage from Cooley cited by the dissenting judge points to the proper 
disposition of the principal case; it declares that the Constitution "is not 
the beginning of law for the state, but that it assumes the existence of a well 
understood system which is still to remain in force and be administered, but 
under such limitations and restrictions as that instrument imposes." Cooley 
on Constitutio11al Limitations (6th ed.), 75. Thus, an act has been held un-
constitutional which made possible a grand jury of ten men in contravention 
to the common law requirement of at least twelve men. State v. Hartley, 22 
Nevada 342, z8 L. R. A. 33; similarly, Carpenter v. State 4 How. (Miss.), 
163, 34 Am. Dec. n6. Since the Nevada Constitution is silent on the ques-
tion of the structure of the grand jury, the common law must be the source of 
information on the matter. 
At the common law the word 'men' was usually used in connection with 
the designation of qualifications of grand jurors. Chitty speaks of "men free 
from all, etc." See Edwards, The Grand Jury, 6o. Blackstone, speaking of 
grand juries, said: "Under the word 'home' also, though a name common 
• 
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to both sexes, the female is, however, excluded propter defectum sexus." 
Coor.Ey's BLACKSTONE (4th ed.), n23. Adjudicated cases are rare. There is 
a strong dictum in Harlandy v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. I3I. The statute 
under which "all qualified electors and householders "were made competent 
to serve as grand jurors was declared unconstitutional because of defect of 
title; but Turner, J., there said: "When legislators have prescribed the qual-
1hcations of jurors, the qualification that they be males has always been 
implied •... and undoubtedly that which is implied would have been express-
ed if it had ever occurred to the members that a subsequent legislature would 
confer the elective franchise on women .•.. 'every statute must be construed 
in the light of the common law'." The point was later decided directly in a 
I9I,7 case. The Code read that a grand jury was "a body of men"; but it also 
provided that "words used in the mascuHne gender include the feminine and 
neuter." The court refused to admit women to the grand jury saying that 
men only could serve because "such was then the common law that women · 
were incompetent to act as jurors." People v. Len~en, (Dist. Court of App., 
Cal.), 34 Cal. App. 336-followed without an opinion in People v. Warner, 
ibid. 8o4. Admitting for the sake of argument that women could not serve at 
common Jaw the court in the principal case argues that "woman's sphere 
under the common law was a circumscribed one,'' that by "modern law and 
custom she has demanded and taken a place in modern institutions as a 
factor equal to man." The Constitution, however must be interpreted in the 
light of the common law as it existed at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution. State v. McClear, II Nev. 39. Radical changes must be left to the 
people, otherwise the broadening scope of the common law would put a tool 
in the hands of opportunists to be used in the undermining of the Con-
stitution. 
Dr;scF.NT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF WIDOW WHO KILLED HUSBAND.-De-
fendant was convicted of manslaughter for killing her husband. In an action 
to quiet title to certain land which had belonged to the victim it was held 
that under Sec. 3856 of the General Statutes of I9I5 defendant had taken 
no interest in such lands as heir of her husband. Ha111bli1i v. Marcha11t 
(Kans., I9I8), I75 Pac. 678. 
In MrA!listcr v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 4 MICH. L. Rr:v. 653, it had been held, 
following the more general rule, that in the absence of statutory provision 
governing the situation a murderer was entitled to succeed by inheritance 
to property of the victim. See further 7 MICH. L. Rr:v. I6o; I3 MICH L. 
REV. 336; I6 M1crr. L. Rr:v. 561. Shortly after the decision in the M cAllistet 
case the Kansas legislature provided that "Any person who shall hereafter 
be convicted of killing*** any other person from whom such person so 
killing*** would inherit. the property*** belonging to such deceased person 
* * * shall be denied all right, interest, and estate in or to said property," etc. 
(R S. I915, Sec. 3856). Conviction of manslaughter was held to be a con-
viction of killing and undoubtedly rightly so. Whether or not the statute 
should apply only to convictions of murder, as in California (fo re Kirby'J 
Est., 1o6 Cal. 9I was a question for the legislature to decide. 
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Evm1mcE-AccoMPI.ICE-S:EPARATE CRIMES. - Defendant was indicted for 
the crime of receiving stolen property. Defendant asked for an instruction 
at the trial that the testimony of the thief should be treated with caution, on 
the ground that the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is entitled 
to diminished credibility. Held, that the instruction was properly refused 
since the two crimes were distinct-the witness could not be indicted for the 
same crime that defendant was indicted for. Bailey v. State (Fla., 1918), 
79 So. 748. 
While most courts seem agreed that the testimony of an accomplice should 
be treated with suspicion if uncorroborated, they are not all agreed in the 
definition of 'accomplice'-especially where the act committed by the witness 
falls into a separate class of crime. The principal case, however, is with the 
weight of authority. A purchaser of liquor sold in violation of the law is 
not an accomplice of the seller. Terry v. State, 44.Tex. Crim. Rep. 4n (nor 
can he be convicted as an acessory), Lott v. U. S. 205 Fed. 28; the perjurer 
is not an accomplice of the suborner, Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 98 Am. St. 
Rep. 145; the donor or offeror of a bribe is not the accomplice of the receiver, 
State v. Durham, 73 Minn. 150; State v. Wappenstein, 67 Wash. 502-Contra, 
Ruffin v State, 36 ·J'ex. Crim. Rep. 565; the participants in an unlawful game 
of cards are not accomplices to one another where each could be convicted 
of the individual crime, Com. v. Bossie, 100 Ky. 151; nor is the purchaser 
of a lottery ticket the accomplice of the seller, Boyd v. Com., 141 Ky. 247. 
In State v. Kuhlman, 152 Mo. 100 it was held, as in the principal case, that 
the thief is not the accomplice of the one who receives stolen goods. But in 
People v. Coffey, 161 Cal. 433, the strongest of the contra cases, it was held 
that the offeror of a bribe is the accomplice of the acceptor on the reasoning 
that an accomplice is "anyone concerned in the commission of a crime". The 
adherence to this broad definition renders it unnecessary to consider whether 
the crimes are distinct. The other test is whether the witness could have 
been convicted for the offense as principal. As far as the reason of the 
thing goes it does not appear why the fact that conviction cannot be had 
for the same crime should have the effect of making the testimony more 
competent; the witness might seek immunity for the crime which he has 
committed as an associate just as readily as he would seek immunity for a 
crime which he and the defendant had committed as principals. As long 
as they are associates in crime it can be of no consequence that the crimes 
are technically separated-the argument of the prevailing opinion is mathe-
matical but hardly meritorious. It can be condoned only on the ground that 
there is some existing tendency to do away with this rule of corroboration 
of the testimony of accomplices. W1GMORE, Sec. 2057. 
Evrn:ENCE-AD:MlSSIBII.lTY-UNI.AWFur, SEARCH OR S:EIZURE.-\Vhile trav-
elling on a public highway defendant was stopped by a deputy sheriff who 
searched his automobile and took therefrom certain intoxicating liquors. 
The sheriff had no· search warrant but had with him a copy of the state faw 
which gave to the sheriff the right of search without a search warrant where 
he had probable cause to suspect that intoxicating liquors were being trans-
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ported within the state of Idaho by means of automobile, truck, wagons, etc. 
Before trial the defendant petitioned for the destruction of the liquor and 
for an order that the same should not be used as evidence against him on 
the ground that the statute under which the sheriff acted was unconstitu-
tional as contrary to the search and seizure clause of the state constitution. 
The petition ·was denied and the defendant was convicted. The Supreme 
Court admitted that the statute was unconstitutional but held that the evi-
dence was not rendered inadmissable by reason of its having been disclosed 
by an unlawful search or obtained by an unlawful seizure. Conviction af-
firmed. Morgan, J., dissenting. State v. Anderson (Idaho, 1918), 177 Pac. 
125. 
The state and federal courts are in direct conflict on this question of the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure 
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. By a great number of decis-
ions the state courts have admitted such evidence. The Supreme Court of 
the United States, on the other hand, has vigorously denied admissibility in 
the few cases that have arisen. It is submitted that the two views cannot 
be reconciled but that they can be explained as a necessary consequence of 
the widely different demands put upon the two governments. The states are 
beset with the demand for a thorough and searching police system which will 
insure a maximum of apprehension of all crimes committed. It is a serious 
problem of local government to be able to deal effectively with the vast num-
ber of crimes that are committed within its jurisdiction. While the states 
have generally followed the federal constitution in their inclusion of a bill 
of rights with its search and seizure clauses and clauses against self-incrim-
ination they seemed to realize, also, that here was an immunity which might 
seriously hinder police administration. As a result we have in the Idaho 
constitution a clause permitting arrest without warrant where the officer has 
information which prompts him to believe that a public offence is being com-
mitted. It is apparent, then, why the state courts should be willing to blink 
at the search and seizure clause, admit the evidence, iVilliams v. State, IOO 
Ga. 5n, and tell the criminal to seek his redress against the sheriff. The 
rttle that collateral issues will not be raised is, consequently, strictly followed. 
Professor WIGMORE is thoroughly in accord with this point of view. Sec. 
2183, 2263-4. The federal government, however, is not troubled with that 
vast number of criminal cases which is a characteristic feature of the state 
administration. Its problem of police administration is, comparatively speak-
ing, an insignificant one. The danger of procrastination through the raising 
of collateral issues is far less serious. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
been more astute to protect the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution. 
The history of that court indicates that it has refused to close its eyes to a 
violation of any of these rights or to relax in the realization of these· rights 
merely because a collateral issue would be raised. "The efforts of the courts 
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment," say:s Mr. Justice DAY 
in Weeks v. U. S., "praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sac-
rifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering 
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 
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232 U. S. 383, 393. There are but few state courts following this view. Town 
of Blacksbttrg v. Beam, I04 S. C. 146, L. R. A. 1916 E. 714; Iowa v. Sheridan, 
121 Ia. 164, where the court sa~d that to allow the evidence would be to 
"emasculate all constitutional guaranty and deprive it of all beneficial force 
or effect in pre\·enting unreasonable searches and seizures". 'l'he Georgia 
Court of Appeals refused to follow, for a time, the leading ease of Williams 
v. Stale, supra, and declined to admit such evidence. U11derwood v. State, 
13 Ga. App. 2o6. But the later decisions have returned to the conventional state 
view. Hornbuckle v. Town of Decatur, 18 Ga. App. 17. While there is ap-
parent conflict, then, it appears that each view is justified under the circum-
stances peculiar to the jurisdiction. They were nearly in accord when Adams 
v. U. S. was decided, but Weeks v. U. S., supra, removed all doubts and 
asserted the theory of non-admissibility in the most vigorous terms. 
EvmtNC£ OF NtGLIGtNC£-PROXlMATS CAusii.~In Todd v. Traders' a11d 
Mee/zanies' Insttrance Company (Mass. 1918), 120 N. E. 142, plaintiff brought 
his action to recover on a fire insurance policy for destruction by fire of cer-
tain buildings. The fire which destroyed the buildings accidentally caught 
from one set by plaintiff without getting permission of the fire-warden as 
the law required. Defense was made that because the fire was set in viola-
tion of law the plaintiff's cause 'of action was defeated on the theory of con-
tributory negligence. 
It would seem that the case was disposed of when it was determined, in 
accord with the universally recoguized rule, that the ordinary fire insurance 
policy protects the insured against his own negligence, but the court dis-
cusses the question of whether violation of law is evidence of negligence to 
defeat a cause of action, itself founded in negligence. It well states the doc-
trine that "the mere fact that he, (plaintiff), was violating a statute or ordi-
nance when injured does not necessarily prevent his recovery. Such viola-
tion is considered evidence of negligence on the part of the violator, as to all 
consequences that the statute was intended to prevent". The court concluded 
that the failure to get the fire-warden's permission was a mere attendant cir-
cumstance of his injury and not a proximate contributing cause, and applying 
the above principle overruled the defense There is plenty of authority in 
.M:assach11setts as well as elsewhere, to justify the recoguition of the prin-
ciple and its application. Moran v. Dickinso1i, 204 Mass. 559; Bottrnc v. 
Whitman, 209 Mass. 155; Hughes v. Atlantic Steel Co., 136 Ga. 5u. One is 
impressed with the rapidity with which things now move in that once con-
sen•ative, puritanic state of Massachusetts. One is almost impelled to won-
der whether the nimble-minded Celt may not have his hand on the throttle. 
It is but three short decades ago that a sin-sick sinner over-anxious for his 
soul's welfare, took to the highway with his good horse and carriage to at-
tend a religious meeting on Sunday. He hitched his horse to the fence by 
the roadside and while he was at his devotions another recklessly injured 
Dobbin and the carriage. The court which pronounced this opinion in Todd 
v. The I11surance Cn. told the refreshed sinner that because his horse and 
carriage had reached the place of injury by having been driven there on 
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Sunday in violation cf law, he was remediless. If the poor sinner's soul was 
lost it would be a pertinent question, whether this opinion was the proximate 
cause. L~•ons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass. 387. Two years earlier the same court 
took occasion to tell a provident head of a family that a railway company 
could run over him with impunity because forsooth, he walked the public 
highway on Sunday in search of shelter for his wife and children. Smith 
v. Boston & M. R. R., 120 Mass. 490. 
SPSCIPIC PSRFORMANC:E-NEGATIVS COVENANT-CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT. 
-Complainant induced defendants to enter into contracts with him whereby 
they agreed to enter the service of complainant for two years from July l, 
1918, and not to be concerned directly or indirectly in any other business 
during the period of the contracts. Defendants at the time of making the 
contracts were employed by the Driver-Harris Co., a corporation engaged in 
important war work for the government. Complainant had been a director 
of the Driver-Harris Co., but owing to disagreement with other directors, 
had withdrawn and was about, as he alleged, to establish a rival company. 
There was evidence tending to show that complainant's main purpose in mak-
ing the contracts was to withdraw essential employees from the Driver-Har-
ris Co. and thus to injure its business. Complainant brought three bills 
against defendants to restrain them from working for the Driver-Harris CO'. 
in violation of the negative covenants. Held, complainant is not entitled to 
relief. Driver v. Smith et al. (N. J. Ch. 1918), 104 Atl. 717. 
The defendants interposed a preliminary objection that the granting of an 
injunction would interfere with work necessary to the federal government 
in the conduct of war. The government did not seek to intervene directly, 
but defendants introduced into evidence letters from General Sibert and oth-
ers to the effect that the enforced withdrawal of the defendants from the 
Driver-Harris Co. would be highly detrimental to the interests of the govern-
ment. Lane, V. C., refused to consider this argument. "It would'', he said, 
"be an intolerable situation if each court before whom the rights of indi-
viduals were litigated, were permitted to determine whether relief should be 
granted or withheld upon its opinion whether the granting of an injunction 
would aid or injure the government in its war activities. * * *" No 
cases precisely 'in point were cited but reliance was placed on Broadbent 
v. Imperial Gas Co., 7 De G. M. & G. 436, and Rowland v. New York Stable 
Manure Co., 88 N. J. Eq. 168. Though the doctrine of these cases has often 
been brought into question (e g. Richards Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 105), the position 
of the court seems sound. The federal government has under war legislation 
ampl~ power to protect itself, and so long as it does not exercise this power, 
there seems no reason why a court of equity in ordinary litigation should 
consider whether its decree will affect governmental activities or not. 
In denying relief to complainant, the court reached a result inevitable 
upon the principles of equity. Complainant failed to show that the de-
fendants could render him service of an unique quality; his remedy at 
law was adequate. But further it appeared that his purpose in making 
the contracts. was primarily to damage the Driver-Smith Co. Equity is 
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not a punitive system and relief is always denied when it will merely make 
trouble for a defendant without conferring any real benefit upon a complain-
ant. Moreover a court of equity will not lend itself to the fttrtheranc~ of 
schemes of which it disapproves. Edwards v. The Allouez Milling Co., 38 
Mich. 46; Poll's Appeal, 9I Pa. St. 434- Due recognition of these principles 
is taken by the court, but it proceeds to suggest other grounds which are 
scarcely tenable. It is stated that the Driver-Harris Co. had a property 
right in the services of the defendants (although they were only employees 
at will), and that an injunction will never be granted if it will destroy a 
property right. The use of the term "property right" is unfortunate. "What-
ever be the effect of Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, and Q1ii1m v. Leathem, 
(190I), App. Cas. 495, it has never been snpposed that an employer has any 
property right in the services of employees at will. Cf. Beekman v. Marsters, 
I95 Mass. 205. Again, it is intimated (p. 724), that as the injunction would 
not insure performance of the positive stipulations in the contract, relief 
should not be given. This is but to revive the outworn criticism of L11mlcy 
v. "fVagner, r De G. M. & G. 205, and coming from so able a court as that of 
New Jersey cannot fail to excite surprise. 
TAxA'tION-!NCOME-DIVIDENDS RECEIVED BY Hex.DING CoMPANY FROM 
SuBSIDI.<\RY CoRPOR.A'l'IONS.-Petitioner was a holding company owning all the 
stock in certain corporations except qualifying shares held by direc-tors. 
'fhese companies under the management of petitioner carried on a large 
business. "The subsidiary companies had retained their earnings, although 
making some loans inter se, and all their funds were invested in properties 
or actually required to carry on the business. * * *. In January, I9I3, the peti-
tioner decided to take over the previously accumulated earnings and surplus 
and did so in that year by votes of the companies it controlled." In a suit 
to recover a tax levied upon these dividends as income under the Act of 
Oct. · 3, I9I3, c. I6, Sec. II (38 Stat. 114, 166), held, reversing the Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the tax was improperly levied. Gulf Oil Corporation ''· 
Lewelly1i, Adv. Ops. U. S. Sup. Ct., Dec. 9, 19I8. 
The decision in this case by the Circuit Court of Appeals was noted in 
I6 MICH. L. IO:v. 202. The general subject is discussed at length in I6 MICH. 
L. Rtv. 232. In the following cases the Supreme Court has disposed of some 
of the most difficult problems arising out of this general situation. Lynch v. 
Turrish, 247 U.S. 22I; Southern Pac. Co. v. I.owe, 247 U.S. 330: Lynch v. 
Hornby, 247 U. S. 339. 
Tur.tGRAPH Coll!PANIES AS CARRIERS oF MONEY.-The Carolinas furnish 
two recent cases on a very common undertaking of telegraph companies, on 
which strangely enough there are few decisions in the books, i.e. on the 
duties and liabilities of telegraph companies as carriers of money. Reaves v. 
Westcnz Unioti 1'el. Co. (S. C. l9I8), g6 S. E. 295, and Leh11e v. ib. (N. C. 
I9I8), g6 S. E. 29. Both were actions for damages for failure to transmit 
promptly money sent by a husband to his wife at a station where no money 
order office was maintained, and the payment had to be made through a 
bank. The latter case was one in which the mother of the wife was ill, and 
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died before she reached her, but this fact was not known when the telegram 
was sent. The other was based on a telegram beginning "Brother dead." 
The one sought damages for mental anguish, the other punitive damages. 
By a narrow construction it has been held generally. that the telegraph 
company is not a common carrier, though it is in a public employment. Tel. 
Co. v. Gri.rn:old, 37 Ohio St. 3or. By constitutional provision or statute it is 
often made so, and the Reeves case holds that the provision in the South 
Carolina constitution is merely declaratory of the common law. T}J.is is not 
the weight of authority. Both cases rightly hold that a telegraph company 
is not bound to establish a money order office at a place where the b11sines1 
does not warrant it. but that it may undertake to deliver money by telegraph, 
and if so it must live up to its contract. This it did in the Lehne case be-
cattse it stipulated to use a bank to make payment, and that it would not be 
liable for the negligence of the bank. In the Reaves case the company un-
dertook the service and was liable for the failure to deliver in the time 
promised. There seems to be little difference in the liability of the telegraph 
company for the transmission of money and of messages. In each case, 
perhaps, nothing is actually carried, but the effect of the undertaking is 
the same. It is sometimes said that a contract to transmit money is a busi-
ness transaction. and the measure of damages is to be the same as for breach 
of a commercial contract. Hence there can be no recovery for mental an-
guish caused by failure to send money, even in states permitting such re-
covery on death messages. Robinson v. W. U. Tel. Co., rr4 Ky. 504. But 
this has been denied, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Wells, 50 Fla. 474 III A. S. R. r29 11, 
and is not followed in Kentucky in W. U. Tel Co v, Sisson, r55 Ky. 624, in a 
case where the agent knew the telegram was to enable a son to secu!"e the 
necessary money to reach his father's bedside, the latter being at the point 
of death. The telegram on its face did not show this. The recent case of 
W. U. Tel. Co. v. Bowm (Ala. I9I7), 76 So. 985 is to the same effect, and 
so apparently are both the cases under review, the Reaves case saying puni• 
tive damages might be recovered for failure to deliver the money where the 
telegram showed on its face the purpose-"Brother dead", and the Lehut 
case refusing the recovery of damages for mental anguish because there was 
no evidence the agent knew of the mother's illness or death. 
WILLS-JURISDICTION IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.-In Iowa v. Slimmer, u. s. 
Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, I9I8, the State of Iowa, with a view to the ultimate collec-
tion of $13,750 in taxes against the property of Abraham Slimmer, deceased, 
sought an order t<;> ensure the dismissal of Minnesota probate proceedings, 
meantime asking an injunction restraining such proceedings, pending thq 
. suit. The bill alleged that the deceased died in Iowa, where he had been 
domiciled many years, leaving notes and Liberty Bonds valued at $550,000, 
nearly all in the custody of his son in Minnesota. For at least five years this 
son had custody of the notes of deceased, in pu~suance of a conspiracy to 
defraud the State of Iowa of taxes. Probate proceedings were started by 
the son in :Minnesota, and by the State of Iowa in Iowa. On the ground 
that at least for purposes of inheritance taxes probate proceedings might be 
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had in Minnesota, and also because the Minnesota court had power to dis-
tribute under the will the property located there even though decedent was 
not a resident of Minnesota, the relief was denied. 
The case involves both taxation and jurisdiction in probate proceedings. 
Generally speaking personal property may be taxed at its situs, or at the 
domic:il of the owner, or both. Buck v. Beach, 2o6 U. S. 392. The situs for 
this purpose in the case of notes is generally the jurisdiction in which th·e 
payment oi the notes must be enforced, and not the place where the notes 
may be deposited, as they are not the property but only evidence of it. It 
is not unconstitutional, however, to impose inheritance taxes on such prop-
erty in the state where the notes are deposited. The principal case relics on 
Wheeler v. New Yor~,, 233 U. S. 434. Bonds and notes secured by mortgages 
may be taxed also at the situs of the security. Overby v. Gordo1i, 177 U. S. 
214. Doubtless by appropriate proceedings the property in the principal case 
can be reached by the taxing power of the state of Iowa. Bristol v. Wash-
i11gtC111 Co., 177 U. S. 133· Wills may be probated at the domicil of the de-
ceased, and also at the situs of the property, if such property is located in 
a foreign state. Only by comity can probate proceedings in one state have 
any effect in another. Whether a finding of domicil of the deceased by one 
court can be collaterally attacked in another is in dispute. To allow this 
question to be raised in different courts and before different juries would 
lead to embarrassing results, as has been well pointed out in the mono-
graphic note 81 Am. State Rep. 548. See also Horto1i v. Dickie, 217 N. Y. 
363, Ann. Cas. 1918 A 6u and note, holding that Ohio proceedings were not 
conclushe upon persons in New York who were not parties to the proceed-
ings. In denying the State of Iowa relief by restraining the Minnesota court 
the instant case seems in accord with all the cases. 
WORDS AND PHRASES-WHAT IS "FooD"?-An information was preferred 
a~ainst defendant under the Food Hoarding Order, for hoarding tea. The 
Order defined "food" as including "every article which is used for food by 
man, or which ordinarily enters into the composition or preparation of hu-
man foc>d." Held, tea is not food, and the information will not lie. Hitlde 
v. AllmiJ11d (1918), 87 L. J. K. B. 893. 
The court was of opinion in the principal case that the Order was aimed 
at those articles which are taken into the system as nourishment, and the 
purpose controls the meaning to be attached to the words used. A simila:r 
case was M erltt v. Beifeld, 194 Ill. App. 364, where the court held that milk 
was a food or a drink depending on whether it was served as part of a meal 
with eatables or was served alone, this distinction being deemed necessary 
to carry out the presumed purpose of a contract for commissions on sales 
of drinks. See also Leavett v. Clark (r915). 3 K. B. !J, which held that an 
information for stealing winkles would lie under a section of the Larceny 
Act referring solely to fish, because it had been held for thirty years, follow-
ing Caygill v. Thwaite, 49 J. P. 614, that a crayfish was a fish, and the court 
could not distinguish between a crayfish and a winkle in respect to its "fish-
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iness". The plodding layman may be pardoned if he sometimes loses con-
tact with the rapidly moving "judicial front'' in the matter of legal defini-
tions. 
WQRKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ACCIDENT ARISING OuT OF AND IN" THE CouRsi-: 
oF Er.rPr.OYMENT-TRAVELING M.\N.-Decedent, employed by defendant to 
travel about soliciting business, finished his work for the week on Saturday. 
On Sunday morning in endeavoring to reach his home by crossing a river 
in a skiff, the railroad being flooded, he was drowned. In proceedings for 
compensation under the statute, held, claimants, decedent's dependents, were 
entitled to recover, death having come to decedent by accident "arising out 
of and in the course of employment." State v. District Court (Minn., I9I8), 
169 N. W. 274. 
Many times have questions arisen as to whether injuries received on the 
way to or from work were such as to come within the above quoted pro-
vision of Workmen's Compensation Acts. Generally such injuries h;:.ve not 
been considered to have arisen in the course of the employment. It is in 
each case a question of fact as to when the employee enters upon or leaves 
his employment. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 26. The right to compensation 
is not limited to those situations in which the injury was received while the 
employee was actually doing his work. As said by one court, "The employ-
ment is not limited by the exact time when the workman reaches the scene of 
his labor and begins it, nor when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time, · 
space, and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of 
employment." Hills v. Blair, sttpra. In this connection the fact as to the 
injury being received while on or off the employer's premises has been deemed 
of weighty though not controlling importance. See Hoskins v. Lancaster, 
3 B. W. C. C. 476; Simdine's Case, 218 Mass. 1; Stacy's Case, 225 Mass. I74; 
Ocean Acc. etc. Co. v. lndttStrial Acc. Co., 173 Cal. 313; Hombttrg v. Mor-
ris, 163 Wis. 31. In the case of commercial travelers there are strong rea-
sons for deeming them in the course of their employment from the time 
they leave home in the morning, until they return in the evening, for they are 
hired to travel. The principal case is in accord with Dickinson v. Barnak 
(C. A.) 124, The Law Times 403 (1908). Cf. Donahtte's Case, 226 Mass. 
595; Hopkins v. Michiga1i Siegar Co., 184 Mich. 87. Of course if the com-
mercial traveler has abandoned his employer's business and is on an enter-
prise of his own there should be no recovery. In the principal case dece-
dent was not engaged in any project of a personal nature other than the 
effort to complete a journey undertaken in the furtherance of his master's 
business. 
